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Introduction
In dynamic environments a timely revelation of useful information is essential for organizations to implement e¢ cient decisions. An organization, however, is susceptible to a dynamic incentive problem when its commitment power is limited. The ratchet e¤ect, for example, is a well known problem -an organization's subdivisions or suppliers resist early revelation of persistent private information because they fear that the revealed information is used for future exploitation. As dynamic incentives play a crucial role for early information revelation, designing optimal structures for operations is a central issue in motivating the agents in a time consistent manner for organizations under limited commitment.
Using an agency framework, we present a theory of delegation based on the idea that delegation mitigates dynamic incentive problems that organizations face over time. In particular, we demonstrate that, by delegating additional tasks to its agents, an organization can increase the rate at which persistent private information is revealed -our analysis uncovers the mechanism by which delegation facilitates early information revelation and identi…es the conditions under which delegation bene…ts the organization. boundaries. They hardly own any manufacturing facilities and, instead, delegate also their manufacturing functions to their suppliers. Apple's supplier in China, for instance, not only provides labor inputs for the …nal assembly of the …nal product but also manufactures the capital intensive components such as semiconductors, LCD panels and camera devices.
Companies like Samsung Electronics, by contrast, operate in a highly centralized structure (See . Samsung's local supplier merely provides labor inputs for the …nal assembly, with virtually no control over capital inputs. 1 As we argue below our theory sheds light on these operational di¤erences -delegation vs. centralization -by stressing the importance of dynamic information revelation.
A primary advantage of operating under centralization is that the organization has more direct control, whereas under delegation, the organization has to relinquish control and put 1 Apple's and Samsung's operational structure are discussed in Lashinsky (2012) and Michell (2010) .
2 faith in the hands of its subdivisions or suppliers. Using a principal-agent model with persistent private information, we show that delegation can nevertheless be advantageous over centralization because it can ease the tension between di¤erent dynamic incentives. In our model, production requires both the agent's labor input, whose e¢ ciency is persistent and his private information, and a capital input. The operational structure can be either centralization or delegation -the principal can centralize the operation by directly controlling the capital input, or delegate the control to the agent.
The principal's commitment power is limited in that she can commit to the operational structure, but cannot commit to the long-term output level and transfer to the agent. In the earlier period, the capital input uses a standard technology whose e¢ ciency is commonly known. In the later period, due to technological progress, the e¢ ciency of the capital input increases with some probability, and the party who is in charge of the input (determined by centralization or delegation) learns the e¢ ciency privately.
In this framework, we identify a tension between two dynamic incentives, each of which is associated with a distinct but persistent labor e¢ ciency of the agent -the ratchet incentive when the agent is e¢ cient, and the take-the-money-and-run 2 incentive when the agent is ine¢ cient. An e¢ cient agent is reluctant to reveal his e¢ ciency in the earlier period, because he fears exploitation and forfeited rents of the persistent information in the later period. To avoid this, the organization must pay the future rents to the e¢ cient agent as a large transfer in the earlier period. However, such a large transfer paid up-front to the e¢ cient agent leads to another incentive problem. When the agent is ine¢ cient, it raises the take-the-moneyand-run incentive in that the ine¢ cient agent will misrepresent his labor e¢ ciency in order to take the large transfer that is meant for the e¢ cient agent in the earlier period, and subsequently reject the o¤er in the later period. The tension between these two incentives obstructs early information revelation under centralization.
In our model, two e¤ects from delegating the control of the capital input to the agent ease the tension between the two dynamic incentives: the well-known play-hardball e¤ect which relaxes the e¢ cient agent's ratchet incentive, and the carrot e¤ect which mitigates the ine¢ cient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive.
The play-hardball e¤ect is well exploited in the literature. 3 It mitigates the e¢ cient agent's ratchet incentive by cutting output more credibly in the later period -these production cuts follow from increased costs of operation due to the agent's additional private information. The anticipated output cuts imply that the e¢ cient agent's expected future rents from his private information become smaller. This, in turn, reduces the agent's opportunity cost of revealing his persistent information in the earlier period. In other words, the play-hardball e¤ect reduces ratcheting and discourages the e¢ cient agent from misrepresenting his e¢ ciency in the earlier period.
In contrast, the carrot e¤ect allows the organization to pledge rents to the agent in the later period, because under delegation, the agent anticipates a future rent from his additional private information. Therefore, if the ine¢ cient agent decides to "run"after mimicking the e¢ cient agent in the earlier period, he will lose this rent in the later period. Delegation therefore discourages the ine¢ cient agent from exaggerating his labor e¢ ciency in the earlier period to play the take-the-money-and-run strategy.
According to our analysis, when the organization faces small uncertainty about operational e¢ ciency, only one of the two e¤ects obtains -the play-hardball e¤ect when operation is likely to be e¢ cient, and the carrot e¤ect when the operation is likely to be ine¢ cient.
In such cases, delegation is optimal only if the organization's capacity expands by a small amount over time. When the uncertainty about operational e¢ ciency is large, however, both the carrot and the play-hardball e¤ect arise and reinforce each other. In such a case, delegation is optimal regardless of the organization's capacity expansion.
Our result is consistent with some empirical studies that address the issue of delegation in operations. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2007) demonstrate that organizations with less information tend to choose decentralized structures for their operations. Speci…cally, they
show that …rms closer to the technological frontier, …rms in more heterogenous environments, and younger …rms are more likely to operate under delegation. These empirical observations are in line with our theoretical prediction that uncertainty favors delegation. 4 Our …ndings are also in agreement with organization studies such as Mintzberg (1979) who argues that centralized structures tend to be adopted when the organization operates in a relatively stable and predictable environment, whereas decentralized structures tend to be adopted when the organization faces a less stable and unpredictable environment. Also Cyert and March (1963/1992) note that having the right information in earlier stages of operation is one of the most important factors for an organization when it faces a large uncertainty. Our result suggests that delegation serves organizations for such a purpose.
This article also sheds light on di¤erences in operating structures of industry leaders and followers. Our result suggests that industry leaders, facing larger uncertainties, have a tendency to delegate more, whereas industry followers tend to operate in a more centralized way. For example, in consumer electronics industry, a company like Apple is an industry leader that operates under a great deal of uncertainties. As mentioned above, the company delegates the entire manufacturing activities to its supplier. By contrast, an industry follower such as Samsung Electronics directly controls its own capital intensive components. 5 We extend our analysis to the following two directions. First, we show that complementarity in operations tend to favor delegation. In particular, the play-hardball e¤ect of delegation is linked to complementarity in production, whereas the carrot e¤ect can survive even when the inputs are perfect substitutes.
Second, we demonstrate that our results are robust when centralization allows for more commitment than delegation -we allow the organization under centralization to o¤er a long-term contract, but with a possibility of renegotiation. 6 Following the distinction in Williamson (1985) that vertical integration enables organizations to use long-term contracts, whereas vertically separated inter-…rm transactions are often restricted to short-term contracts, this extension allows us to apply our results to the issue of organizational boundary.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The related literature is discussed in Section 2. We present the model in Section 3. Centralization under which the principal directly controls the capital input is analyzed in Section 4. Delegation of the control to the agent is analyzed in Section 5. Extensions of our analysis are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A. In Appendix B, we demonstrate that our results are robust when considering semi-separating strategies.
Related Literature
There are previous studies that provide economic rationales for delegation in dynamic environments, but they do not examine its role in facilitating dynamic information revelation in 5 In an interview with the New York Times, (February 13, 2013), Samsung's executive vice president adhered to this view of Apple as the industry leader and Samsung as a follower. Michell (2010) describes Samsung's centralized operation as an "obsession with owning a factory." 6 We thank the editor for suggesting to consider this extension.
5 the presence of ratchet e¤ects. Crémer (1995) , using an incomplete contract approach, shows that an organization may bene…t from delegation that limit information ‡ows and keep the agent at a distance. Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) point out that delegation can make it harder to achieve a successful renegotiation. 7 Aghion and Tirole (1997) demonstrate that delegation induces acquisition of useful information for the organization. In a model with full commitment, La¤ont and Martimort (1998) show that delegation enables the organization to e¤ectively discriminate transfers among di¤erent agents, thus mitigating the agents' incentives to collude. 8 Studies such as Dessein (2002) and Alonso et al. (2008) show that organizations can bene…t from delegation because it makes better use of private information.
The following studies exploit the links between operational structures and dynamic incentives. Meyer et al. (1996) show that assigning the agents joint responsibility for tasks alleviates ratchet problems. Olsen and Torsvik (2000) show that a …rm's ability to learn about the di¢ culty of the tasks workers engage in will induce the …rm to give workers more discretion over tasks and weaker incentives. 9 Aghion et al. (2004) shows that delegation of the earlier task induces the worker to reveal his private information, of which the project owner can take advantage in making a decision for the later task. None of them, however, consider a tension aroused from di¤erent incentives of the agent of di¤erent types.
Finally, there are studies related to the extensions in our article. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , for example, show that organizations may want to deliberately limit the contingencies on which an incentive contract should depend when renegotiation is possible. Unlike their study, our focus is on operational structures and organizational boundaries. Olsen (1996) shows that, under renegotiation, vertical integration can be dominated by vertical separation. In his study, however, vertical separation is not accompanied by increased proportion of manipulable information and decreased explicit commitment power. In our study, vertically separated transactions can only be governed by short-term contracts, and induce more private information on the agent's part. In this sense, our …nding complements the
The Model
We study a dynamic adverse selection model with persistent private information, in which a principal hires an agent for the production over two periods (t = 1; 2). Production requires two complementary inputs: labor and capital. The labor input must be provided by the agent. The agent's labor e¢ ciency, L ; is e¢ cient, h , with probability ; and ine¢ cient, l , with probability 1 , where 0 < l < h < 1: The agent's labor e¢ ciency is his private information and persistent in that it does not change between the two periods.
Unlike the labor input, the control of the capital input can be allocated to either the principal or the agent. We denote by 2 fC; Dg the …rm's operational structure regarding the allocation of control. Under centralization, = C, the principal directly controls the capital input, whereas under delegation, = D, the agent controls it. The party who controls the capital input bears the cost of the input. To make our point in a parsimonious setting, we assume that the capital input in t = 1 uses a standard technology whose e¢ ciency is commonly known. In t = 2; the capital e¢ ciency improves due to technological progress.
In line with Riordan (1990) , we assume that only the party who controls it privately learns its e¢ ciency.
The First Period In the …rst period (t = 1); the labor and the capital input levels, denoted by q 1 and q 1 respectively, are: q 1 ; q 1 2 f0; 1g: 10 The marginal cost of the agent's labor input is given by 1 L ; where L 2 fh; lg: As mentioned above, the capital e¢ ciency in t = 1 is common knowledge. The marginal cost of the capital input is normalized to 1. Because the labor and the capital input are complements, they yield an output Q 1 = 2 minfq 1 ; q 1 g.
Therefore q 1 = q 1 in equilibrium, and we let:
Hence, Q 1 = 2q 1 , the cost of the labor input is (1 L )q 1 ; L 2 fh; lg; and the cost of the capital input is q 1 in t = 1: The principal pays a transfer T 1 to the agent in t = 1:
The Second Period In the second period (t = 2); technological progress a¤ects e¢ ciency of the capital input and production capacity. The capital e¢ ciency in t = 2 is denoted by K ; which measures the size of the reduction in marginal cost from 1 to 1 K : Again, K is privately observed by the party who controls it before the second period contract is o¤ered. It is e¢ cient, h , with probability and ine¢ cient, l , with probability 1 .
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The e¢ ciency of the capital and the labor input are stochastically independent. Production capacity increases in t = 2; and as a result, the labor and the capital input levels, denoted by q 2 and q 2 respectively, are: q 2 ; q 2 2 f0; g, where > 1: As before, Q 2 = 2 minfq 2 ; q 2 g; and therefore q 2 = q 2 in equilibrium. We again let:
Hence, Q 2 = 2q 2 and input costs are (1 L )q 2 and (1 K )q 2 ; L; K 2 fh; lg in t = 2: The principal pays the transfer T 2 to the agent in t = 2:
Limited Commitment The principal can commit to the long-term operational structure, 2 fC; Dg; but not to the long-term output levels and transfers -the output targets and transfers are decided and o¤ered to the agent in the beginning of each period. This assumption captures limits on commitment in practise. 12 As well documented, even when the top management of an organization has a clear vision of a new strategy, managing operational change is extremely di¢ cult or impossible (see Argyris, 1982 and Schein, 2004) , 13 whereas wages and production targets are often reneged. The organization's limited commitment implies the following structure and timing of contracting. At the outset, the principal commits to the operational structure 2 fC; Dg. In the beginning of t = 1; the principal o¤ers the agent the …rst period contract that speci…es the input level q 1 (= q 1 = q 1 ) and the transfer to the agent T 1 . The transfer compensates the agent for his labor input and, depending on the operational structure, the cost of the capital input. In the beginning of t = 2; the principal's o¤er speci…es the input level q 2 (= q 2 = q 2 ) and the transfer to the agent T 2 .
The o¤er in t = 2 must be sequentially rational -it must be optimal in the beginning of t = 2, conditional on the entire information that the principal has learned up to that point.
Our approach is to analyze …rst the implementable outcomes under centralization and 11 For simplicity, we consider the symmetric case, = = ,
we extend our study to the case with input speci…c cost di¤erences. The case where 6 = is presented in the earlier version of this paper (accessible at http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/…lemgr?…le_id=7310604). 12 The limited commitment in our paper is a standard assumption in the literature. See also Dessein (2002) and Alonso et al. (2008) for similar assumptions. 13 See also Economist (July 20th 2000) reporting that bad performances of many mergers are due to unreconcilable di¤erence in operational structures between the merging …rms that failed to be harmonized.
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delegation with a special regard to the timing of information revelation. We then compare their optimality from the principal's perspective. We start our analysis with centralization.
Centralization ( = C)
An obvious advantage of centralization is that the principal has direct control over the capital input and thus learns its e¢ ciency. As a result, she does not have to provide any incentives for eliciting the information on the capital e¢ ciency from the agent. On the other hand, a possible complication is that, because K is the principal's private information, the agent may interpret the principal's contract o¤er in the second period as a signal about her private information. Under centralization, however, the capital e¢ ciency K is irrelevant to the agent, and thus such signaling is inconsequential. This irrelevance actually allows us to simplify the analysis by treating the setup under centralization as if the second period contract can condition directly on the true K . 14 With this in mind, we can now describe the contracting game that results in the centralized operational structure = C.
The …rst period contract speci…es the input level q 1 and the transfer T 1 . Under centralization, the principal incurs the cost of the capital input, which is q 1 in t = 1: The principal's and the agent's …rst period payo¤s are respectively:
Because the capital e¢ ciency in t = 1 is commonly known, the …rst period contract
is contingent only on the agent's report on his labor e¢ ciency L : The …rst period contract under centralization has the structure:
where
; where L 2 fh; lg: Similarly, the second period contact, specifying the input level q 2 and the transfer T 2 , results in the following payo¤s for the principal and the agent respectively:
14 It is indeed straightforward to check that all equilibrium outcomes that we obtain depend on K in such a way that the principal does not have an incentive to misrepresent K . Technically speaking, we have an informed principal problem, which is innocuous because it concerns only private values.
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Under centralization the principal learns K privately, but as explained above, we can treat the information as public. Because, after t = 1 the agent's labor e¢ ciency L may or may not be revealed, we express the second period o¤er, C 2 ; as:
where L 2 is the agent's report in t = 2 about his labor e¢ ciency L . For notational conve-
The timing of the contracting game under centralization = C is as follows: For this timing, we analyze the principal's optimal o¤ers. Because of the principal's limited commitment, the question will not only be how the principal induces a revelation of private information optimally, but also when any such revelation is to occur. More speci…-cally, the question is whether it is optimal for the principal to structure contracts such that the …rst period report L 1 reveals already all the information about L ; or whether it is better to use also the second report
To address the timing of information revelation, we classify …rst period contracts
by the degree of early information revelation they induce. For expositional reasons, we will concentrate on the two extremes: …rst period contracts that induce no information revelation and those that induce full information revelation. We relegate the formal analysis of the intermediate case to Appendix B, where we demonstrate that delegation is optimal also with respect to a …rst period contract that induces a partial revelation of information (semi-separating).
Centralization without Early Information Revelation
A …rst period contract that does not elicit any direct or indirect information from the agent induces the same outcome in t = 1 regardless of the agent's labor e¢ ciency. Such a contract is equivalent to a …rst period contract that is independent of the agent's report on L .
Therefore, we can express such a pooling contract for t = 1 as follows:
With a pooling contract, no information is revealed in t = 1. Hence, in the beginning of t = 2, the principal still has the prior belief that the agent's labor input is e¢ cient. Because the principal learns K directly under centralization, in t = 2 the sequentially rational o¤er,
2 g for each case of K 2 fh; lg; maximizes her expected payo¤:
subject to the agent's participation constraints,
and the agent's incentive compatibility constraints,
The principal's maximization problem re ‡ects the familiar trade-o¤ between rents and productive e¢ ciency. In t = 2; the principal's …rst option is to o¤er again a pooling contract that guarantees production but at the expense of an information rent to the e¢ cient agent.
Alternatively, she can save on information rents by o¤ering a separating contract that only induces the e¢ cient agent to engage in production. Because the principal's trade-o¤ between these two options depends on her beliefs about the agent's labor e¢ ciency, we introduce the following de…nition.
With this de…nition the following lemma characterizes the principal's sequentially rational contract in t = 2.
Lemma 1 Given
CP 1 in t = 1; the sequentially rational contract
in t = 2 is as follows:
The lemma shows that, after o¤ering a pooling contract in t = 1, the principal also pools in t = 2 when her belief about the agent's e¢ ciency is relatively pessimistic. When pessimistic, the principal provides information rents for ensuring production by pooling the agent's e¢ ciencies in t = 2. In contrast, separation is optimal when the principal has optimistic beliefs about the agent's type. For intermediate beliefs, Lemma 1 shows that the principal's decision to pool or to separate in t = 2 depends on the e¢ ciency of the capital input. More speci…cally, the principal is more eager to have production when the capital input is e¢ cient. The reason is that, when the capital input is e¢ cient, production is more valuable so that the principal is more inclined to o¤er a pooling contract to ensure production.
With Lemma 1, the principal's optimal payo¤ from a pooling o¤er in t = 1 follows straightforwardly.
Proposition 1 Under centralization, the principal's maximum expected payo¤ without inducing early information revelation is:
Centralization with Early Information Revelation
A …rst period contract that induces early information revelation leads to separating the agent's labor e¢ ciencies in t = 1. We denote such a separating contract as CS 1 , which induces the agent to reveal his labor e¢ ciency completely in t = 1. Thus, a …rst period separating contract CS 1 has a structure as in (1) and, in addition, satis…es incentive constraints which ensure the agent's truthful report on L :
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With a …rst period separating contract, the principal learns the agent's labor e¢ ciency in t = 1. In t = 2, therefore, centralization allows the principal to make her contract o¤er under full information. It is therefore straightforward to derive the sequentially rational contract o¤er in t = 2.
Lemma 2 Given
CS 1 in t = 1, the sequentially rational contract
The lemma above shows that in t = 2; the agent is fully exploited, i.e., receives zero rent regardless of his labor e¢ ciency. It follows that the lemma captures the potential "ratchet" incentive due to the principal's limited commitment. Without any pre-commitment, the principal in t = 2 o¤ers the contract, taking into account all information that she has learned and, in particular, the agent's revelation of his e¢ ciency in t = 1.
Using Lemma 2, we are now ready to discuss the …rst period contract that separates the agent's labor e¢ ciencies (q Lemma 3 Under centralization, a separating contract in t = 1 cannot be implemented.
The intuition behind the lemma is as follows. As explained above, the e¢ cient agent will be exploited in t = 2 if he reveals his true e¢ ciency in t = 1: This is fully anticipated by the agent, and therefore the sum of rents over the two periods must be paid up-front for the e¢ cient agent for an information revelation in t = 1: Such a generous …rst period o¤er is, however, also attractive to the ine¢ cient agent and induces him to play the "take-the-moneyand-run" strategy. That is, the ine¢ cient agent will take the principal's o¤er in t = 1 (for the e¢ cient agent) by misrepresenting his e¢ ciency, but he will not take the o¤er in t = 2 because his rent in that period will be negative if he takes the o¤er. The infeasibility of early information revelation is therefore due to a combination of two problems: the rachet problem associated with the e¢ cient agent, and the take-the-money-and-run problem associated with the ine¢ cient agent.
Lemma 3 further implies that the payo¤, CP ; as presented in Proposition 1 represents the principal's maximum payo¤ under centralization.
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We next analyze the structure of optimal contracts under delegation ( = D), where the agent is in charge of the capital input so that he privately learns its e¢ ciency in t = 2. As in the case of centralization, the …rst period contract under delegation,
; speci…es the input level q 1 and the transfer T 1 . Under delegation the agent incurs the cost of the capital input.
Hence, the principal's and the agent's …rst period payo¤s are respectively:
Likewise, the principal's and the agent's second period payo¤s are respectively:
Because the capital e¢ ciency in the …rst period is common knowledge, D 1 has the same structure as the one under centralization. The second period contract D 2 ; however, is contingent on the agent's report on both L and K because both the labor and the capital e¢ ciency are the agent's private information. We express the second period contract as:
where L 2 and K 2 are the agent's reports on the e¢ ciencies of the two inputs. As before,
must be sequentially rational given the …rst period contract,
The timing of the contracting game under delegation = D is as follows: 
Delegation without Early Information Revelation
A …rst period contract that induces no early information revelation implies pooling in t = 1
and is therefore expressed as:
Without information revelation in t = 1, the agent in t = 2 is privately informed of the e¢ ciencies of both the labor and the capital input. From the principal's perspective, the situation in t = 2 is equivalent to facing an agent with three possible cost types Lemma 4 The principal's maximum expected payo¤ under delegation without early information revelation is strictly smaller than her maximum expected payo¤ under centralization.
As a result it is clear that, if the principal bene…ts from delegation at all, then the bene…ts arise from a possibility to induce early information revelation. We investigate this possibility next.
Delegation with Early Information Revelation
As in the case of centralization, we can express a …rst period contract with early information revelation as:
In addition, DS 1 must be incentive compatible so that the agent truthfully reports L in t = 1: Again, a …rst period separating contract exhibits q h 1 = 1 and q l 1 = 0: With separation in t = 1, the principal receives an informative report about the agent's true labor e¢ ciency in t = 1. This report a¤ects the principal's beliefs and hence her subsequent contract in t = 2: Thus, we can view the principal's second period o¤er as contingent on the agent's report on his labor e¢ ciency in t = 1 and his report on the capital e¢ ciency in t = 2: The principal's second period contract is expressed as:
where superscript L represents the agent's report L 1 about his labor e¢ ciency in t = 1 and superscript K represents his report K 2 about the capital input e¢ ciency in t = 2. With DS 1 , the principal will be fully informed about the agent's labor e¢ ciency after the agent sends his report in t = 1: Therefore, the sequentially rational contract for the second period, DS 2 after a …rst period report
h ; l g maximizes her second period payo¤:
and the incentive compatibility constraints,
Again, the principal faces a trade-o¤ between pooling and separating -ensuring output vs. extracting information rent. With separation in t = 1; however, the agent's private information in t = 2 now concerns only the e¢ ciency of the capital input, K . The next lemma shows how the principal's sequentially rational o¤er in t = 2 depends on her belief that the capital input is e¢ cient.
Lemma 5 Given
DS 1 in t = 1, the sequentially rational contract
The agent gets no rent in t = 2.
Although Lemma 5 underlies a similar intuition as before, it is important to note that the optimal sequential rational contract now depends on the principal's belief about the capital input e¢ ciency rather than the agent's labor e¢ ciency. Moreover, the cuto¤ point of at which pooling prevails over separation depends on the agent's report in t = 1; because it determines the principal's cost of foregone revenues from abandoning output in t = 2:
Crucial for our subsequent analysis is the agent's rent from the sequentially rational contract, DS 2 ; because it determines to what extent the principal can induce the agent to reveal his information in t = 1. Importantly, not only the agent's rent on the equilibrium matters, but also his potential rent o¤ the equilibrium. Thus, we need to examine explicitly the agent's strategy for the "o¤-the-equilibrium" event that the agent with labor e¢ ciency L misreports his e¢ ciency by sending a report ( in t = 2 and report the capital e¢ ciency K truthfully.
Lemma 6 con…rms that, like under centralization, the ine¢ cient agent will, in case of misreporting in t = 1; adopt the take-the-money-and-run strategy by rejecting the principal's o¤er for t = 2: For the e¢ cient agent, the sequentially rational contract in t = 2 is individually rational and incentive compatible irrespective of his report in t = 1. Then, parallel to Lemma 3, the question is whether there exists a contract
that keeps the agent from misreporting in t = 1.
exists when one of the following conditions holds:
iii) >^ ( h ) and < 1= :
Lemma 7 is the counterpart of Lemma 3 and shows this study's key insight that early information revelation is easier to achieve under delegation than under centralization. Recall that early information revelation under centralization could not be implemented, because of an irreconcilable tension between the rachet problem associated with the e¢ cient agent and the take-the-money-and-run problem associated with the ine¢ cient agent. Under delegation, the principal can, for two distinct reasons, deal with this tension more easily.
First, for ^ ( h ); the sequentially rational contract
provides a rent to the agent regardless of his labor e¢ ciency L . This second period rent acts as a "carrot"and alleviates the take-the-money-and-run problem, because the ine¢ cient agent loses this future rent if he decides to run away in t = 2. We note that, even though the rent in t = 2 bene…ts both types, it is only the rent to the ine¢ cient agent that alleviates dynamic incentives.
Second, for >^ ( l ), the sequentially rational contract
reduces production when the capital input is reported to be ine¢ cient. Hence, delegation enables the principal to commit credibly to a reduced production in t = 2. This play-hardball e¤ect di¤ers from the carrot e¤ect in that it reduces the ratchet problem rather than the take-the-money-and-run problem. Due to the credible production cut in t = 2, the e¢ cient agent's information rent for that period becomes smaller, which in turn makes the agent less reluctant to reveal his information in t = 1:
Lemma 7 shows how these two strategic e¤ects of delegation alleviate dynamic incentive problems. For <^ ( l ); delegation displays only the carrot e¤ect that reduces the takethe-money-and-run problem. For >^ ( h ); delegation displays only the play-hardball e¤ect that reduces the rachet problem. Notice that for these ranges of ; delegation can be implemented only if the capacity expansion parameter is not too large. For a large ; the carrot e¤ect alone (when is small) cannot ease the tension between the two incentive problems -the rent in the second period is not large enough compared to the large transfer to the e¢ cient agent. As a result, the ine¢ cient agent cannot be discouraged from taking the large transfer in the …rst period by mimicking the e¢ cient agent. Likewise, for a large
; the play-hardball e¤ect alone (when is large) cannot ease the tension between the two incentive problems -although the production cut for t = 2 is credible, the probability that such a cut takes place is small as is large. A small chance of the production cut for t = 2 leads to a large transfer to the e¢ cient agent in t = 1 for his truthful behavior. Then again, such a large transfer invites the ine¢ cient agent's misrepresenting behavior.
, delegation is especially e¤ective in inducing early information revelation. Within this range, delegation has both the carrot and play-hardball e¤ect, and therefore targets both the ratchet and the take-the-money-and-run problem. As mentioned above, the rent in t = 2 acting as a carrot discourages the ine¢ cient agent to play the take-the-money-and-run strategy in t = 1: In addition, due to the play-hardball e¤ect, the principal can reduce the ratchet problem associated with the e¢ cient agent, which allows the principal to lower the transfer in the …rst period to the e¢ cient agent. The smaller transfer to the e¢ cient agent, in turn, further discourages the ine¢ cient from playing the take-themoney-and-run strategy. Notice that, within this range of ; delegation can implement separation in t = 1 regardless of the capacity expansion parameter .
Although the previous lemma shows that early revelation is easier to implement under delegation, it does not say that it is actually optimal for the principal to do so. In order to address the optimality, we …rst derives the principal's maximum payo¤ under delegation when early information revelation is induced.
Proposition 2 Under delegation, the principal's maximum expected payo¤ with early information revelation is:
The remaining task is to compare the payo¤s CP in Proposition 1 with DS in Proposition 2. This comparison yields our main result: . The optimal operational structure is as follows:
( delegation is optimal if < e and >^ (0), centralization is optimal otherwise.
centralization is optimal otherwise. [
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To summarize, the key trade-o¤ in choosing the operational structure is between control vs. dynamic incentives. Centralization allows the principal more direct control, whereas delegation allows the principal to improve dynamic incentives and, thereby, induces the agent to reveal his private information earlier. As a result, delegation is optimal when information revelation is important relative to the loss of control.
Extensions
In this section, we extend our discussion in two directions. First, we examine the role of complementarity in production. We argue that the carrot e¤ect is robust to the degree of complementarity, whereas the play-hardball e¤ect reacts more sensitively to it. As a result we conclude that complementarity in production tends to favor delegation.
Second, we investigate how our results change when the organization under centralization has more commitment power than the organization under delegation in that, under centralization, the organization can o¤er a long-term contract but is susceptible to renegotiation. We show that centralization under large uncertainty remains suboptimal, despite its larger degree of commitment. We further argue how this extension enlarges the scope of our analysis and may be used to address questions about the optimal boundary of the …rm by following the idea that decisions that are taken outside the …rm tend to increase private information and limit the …rm's commitment power.
Role of Complementarity
So far, we have assumed that the labor and the capital input are complements. In this subsection, we discuss the case in which the two inputs are substitutes. Consider the following fully substitutive production function:
In line with the previous section, the …rm's production capacity is limited to Q 1 = 2 in the …rst period and expands to Q 2 = 2 in the second period, where > 1. That is,
We …rst show that, in our parsimonious symmetric setting, a fully substitutive production function allows the principal to circumvent the ratchet e¤ect completely. As a result, centralization with the substitutive technology implements separation in t = 1 at no cost, thus dominating delegation. 15 Under centralization, the …rst period contract that induces early information revelation is:
The second period contract speci…es the agent's labor input q LK 2 and the transfer T LK 2 ; contingent on the revealed labor e¢ ciency in t = 1 and the true capital e¢ ciency. Given CS 1 in t = 1, the following contract C 2 in t = 2 is sequential rational:
Because the agent's labor e¢ ciency is fully revealed in t = 1 and can be substituted by the capital input controlled by the principal, no labor input is used in t = 2 unless the agent's labor input is more e¢ cient than the capital input. With the outcome in (6), we examine whether there exists a contract
that implements the agent's truthful report in t = 1.
Proposition 4 Suppose the labor and the capital input are substitutes and symmetrical ex
ante. Then, a separating contact
exists and centralization is optimal.
With the substitutive technology, the principal can always replace the agent's labor input with the capital input. Therefore, under centralization, the agent must compete with the capital input controlled by the principal. In a symmetric setting, centralization allows the principal to replace the agent's expensive labor with the capital input whenever the agent misreports his e¢ ciency. This allows the principal to circumvent the ratchet e¤ect, because an e¢ cient agent does not expect to obtain any rents from his labor input in t = 2 if he reports to be ine¢ cient. Hence, unlike in the case of complementary inputs, centralized operation is able to induce early information revelation at no cost.
We, however, emphasize that the result in Proposition 4 is due to the simplifying assumption that the input e¢ ciencies are symmetrical ex ante. In order to discuss the robustness of the play-hardball and the carrot e¤ect with regard to complementarity in production, we have to consider substitutive production in a slightly more general framework. In particular,
we let the e¢ ciencies be input speci…c. The agent's labor input e¢ ciency in t = 1 is h with probability and l with probability 1 , where = h l > 0. We keep the assumption that in t = 1, the marginal cost of the capital input is commonly known to be
In t = 2, it is
h with probability and l with probability 1 . Now if l > l then the sequential rational contract (6) implies that q ll is 2 rather than zero. As a result in t = 2 maximizes:
subject to the incentive constraint for the agent for revealing K :
2 ; 8K; K 0 2 fh; lg and his individual rationality constraint:
0; 8L; K 2 fh; lg:
As usual, the incentive constraint of the agent when K = h and the individual rationality constraint of the agent when K = l are binding. Substitution of these constraints, yields that the sequentially rational inputs q 
under the capacity restrictions: q The second term in expression (7), representing the case when the capital input has the low e¢ ciency l ; plays a crucial role for understanding the role of complementarity in establishing the play-hardball and the carrot e¤ect. To explain, we separate out the second term in (7) as follows:
As can be seen from (8), when the capital e¢ ciency is l ; the optimal usage of inputs is distorted towards labor, because the principal discounts the low e¢ ciency l by the term =(1 ). This is because the agent's private information on the capital input reduces the principal's valuation of the capital input, which in turn results in the usual downward distortion of the capital input in production.
With a complementary production technology, the reduced valuation of the capital input implies that the principal reduces both the capital input and the agent's labor input. This joint reduction constitutes the play-hardball e¤ect that alleviates dynamic incentives. In a substitutive framework, the reduced e¢ ciency of capital means, by contrast, that the principal substitutes capital in favor of labor. Thus, the reduction in the capital input leads to an increase rather than a reduction in the agent's labor input. Consequently, there is no play-hardball e¤ect under a substitutive production technology. In this case, the ine¢ cient agent anticipates an expected rent of 2 in t = 2: 16 This expected rent signi…es exactly the carrot e¤ect that discourages the ine¢ cient agent from playing the take-the-money-and-run strategy.
Summarizing, when the inputs are substitutive, delegation can still exhibit a carrot e¤ect, but the play-hardball e¤ect is lost. As a result, the optimality of delegation becomes weaker.
We conclude this subsection by stating this insight as follows.
Result Complementarity in operation shifts the trade-o¤ between delegation and centralization in favor of delegation.
Modes of Commitment: Organizational Boundary
In our base model, the principal could only o¤er short-term contracts. This raises the question, whether such an extreme form of limited commitment is crucial for delegation to outperform centralization. In this subsection, we demonstrate that delegation is also optimal under less extreme forms of limited commitment and even holds when we relax the degree of limited commitment only for centralization. In particular, we study a centralized 16 Note that if l = l = l then the inequality never holds so that the carrot e¤ect under these parameter constellations does not obtain. Extending our framework to incorporate type dependent e¢ ciencies therefore allows us to show more clearly how and why the carrot e¤ect obtains with a substitutive production function.
structure in which the principal in the …rst period can commit to the contract for the second period, but if the second period contract turns out to be ex post ine¢ cient, she renegotiates away the ine¢ ciency. 17 For the delegated structure, however, we continue to assume that the principal can only o¤er short-term contracts. In other words, we allow the organization under centralization to o¤er a long-term contract with a possibility of renegotiation, whereas under delegation the principal is still restricted to short-term contracting. Thus, centralization now has an additional advantage over delegation -it gives the principal more commitment.
We …rst derive the equilibrium outcome under long-term contracting with renegotiation.
The renegotiation-proofness principle (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) ensures that there is no loss of generality in focusing on direct mechanisms that are renegotiation-proof. Our approach is, therefore, to derive …rst the optimal renegotiation-proof contracts under centralization for the two cases -pooling and separating in the …rst period. We next compare them to the principal's optimal payo¤ under delegation DS as derived in Proposition 2.
Under pooling, where no early information revelation is induced, the output levels in
At the end of the …rst period, the agent is still privately informed about his labor e¢ ciency. Therefore, any renegotiation takes place with the principal's belief about the agent's labor e¢ ciency. It is then straightforward to see that the principal's payo¤ is the same as the one in Proposition 1.
Hence, for pooling contracts the optimal short-term contract and the optimal renegotiationproof, long-term contract coincide. This, however, is not the case for separating contracts.
Indeed, whereas …rst-period separation is not implementable with short-term contracts, it is implementable with a long-term contract under renegotiation. The reason is twofold. First, renegotiation-proof contracts enable the principal to pledge a strictly positive rent to the e¢ cient agent. Second, they allow her to contractually prevent the ine¢ cient agent from playing the take-the-money-and-run strategy.
In order to derive the optimal renegotiation-proof contract that induces …rst period separation, note …rst that for any such contract the output levels in t = 1 are q According to the proposition above, our result that delegation outperforms centralization is robust to the ability of the organization to o¤er long-term contracts, unless centralization allows the use ex post ine¢ cient contracts. As mentioned above, when the principal o¤ers a long-term contract in the beginning of the …rst period, she no longer faces the takethe-money-and-run problem associated with the ine¢ cient agent. Yet, the e¢ cient agent's reluctance to reveal his information still has bite because he anticipates the principal's renegotiation. Thus, the play-hardball e¤ect survives, and this explains why even with long term contracts centralization is suboptimal under large uncertainty. Because the previous subsection revealed that the play-hardball e¤ect arises only under complementarity, the optimality of delegation now depends crucially on such complementarity. 18 By following Williamson (1985) 's view that long-term contracts better characterize intra…rm transactions, whereas spot contracts better describe transactions in outsourcing relationships, Proposition 5 has relevance for the theory of the …rm and organizational boundaries: 18 Our result that complementarity favors delegation is in line with the property rights literature (e.g., Hart and Moore 1990) which argues that complementarity favors integration. To see this, note that, the agent under delegation controls both inputs, which Hart and Moore (1990) interpret as integration.
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Firms that operate under a large degree of uncertainty outsource more than …rms that operate under more certainty. This insight may shed light on di¤erences in operating structures of industry leaders and followers as alluded to in the introduction.
Conclusion
When organizations have limited commitment, dynamic incentive problems arise which limit the rate at which they can induce their agents to reveal private information. Our analysis shows that delegation mitigates these dynamic incentive problems and enables a more timely revelation of information. The drawback of delegation is however a loss of control.
These insights suggest a theory of optimal organizational design, which hinges on a tradeo¤ between dynamic incentives vs. control: Organizations bene…t from delegation if timely information revelation is more valuable than the cost of losing control associated with the delegation. Our analysis shows that this is the case when uncertainty is large and matters.
Moreover, delegation is especially helpful when there are complementarity in operations.
Taking a positive perspective, these insights yield a set of hypotheses to test our theory. Because the bene…t of delegation stems from its ability to facilitate the revelation of persistent information, a …rst direct empirical prediction is that organizations with higher degree of delegation are more prevalent in environments where persistent private information matters and the organization's commitment abilities to protect its agents against a dynamic exploitation of such information is limited. Our analytical results yield the further empirical predictions that delegation is more prevalent in environments in which there is more uncertainty (in terms of our model, when is intermediate) and the di¤erences in e¢ ciency are potentially large (in terms of our model, when the e¢ ciency gap is large). 19 To see this latter implication, note that de…ning ^ ^ ( h ) ^ ( l ) and di¤erentiating with respect to h and l yields, respectively,
Moreover, the curve^ shifts up as well, when increases.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 For each K 2 fh; lg, we solve problem P K :
(2) and (3):
As is standard, only the participation constraint in (2) with respect to the ine¢ cient type l and the incentive constraint in (3) with respect to the e¢ cient type h are binding. These
After substituting these transfers into the objective function, we are left to solve:
The objective function is increasing in q 
we have the three cases as speci…ed in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1 For ^ ( l ), it follows from Lemma 1 that the sequentially rational contract yields the principal a second period payo¤ of Proof of Lemma 2 Given the agent's report on L in t = 1; the principal believes to face the agent of type L 2 f h ; l g with certainty. Thus, she believes that the agent's
0. Maximizing the principal's pro…ts 2q
subject to the agent's participation constraint yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 3
Given that the agent anticipates the second period contract CS 2 , the contract
and
where the "max" expression captures the agent's possibility to play his "take-the-moneyand-run"strategy and reject the second period contract. Using q h 1 = 1, q l 1 = 0, and Lemma 2 to substitute out the equilibrium quantities, the incentive constraints simplify to:
These constraints imply that: 
As usual, the participation constraint for the most ine¢ cient type l ; and the incentive constraints for the more e¢ cient adjacent types, h (for m ) and m (for l ), are binding provided that this solution yields a non-decreasing schedule q
Substitution into the objective function and using the de…nition of j and j implies that we maximize:
(1 )
Maximizing the expression with respect to q h 2 2 f0; g yields q h 2 = . Maximizing the expression with respect to q m 2 2 f0; g, we get q
, which is equivalent to , and q m 2 = 0 otherwise with
Finally, maximizing the expression with respect to q l 2 2 f0; g, we get q
, which is equivalent to , and q l 2 = 0 otherwise with 1
The
, which is equivalent to
. But the last inequality holds due to
For , the sequentially rational contract yields the principal a second period payo¤ of 2 = 2 l and the ine¢ cient agent L = l expects a payo¤ , because he becomes type m with probability . For 2 ( ; ] the principal's payo¤ is 2 = [1 (1
and the ine¢ cient agent expects a zero payo¤. For > , the principal's payo¤ is 2 = 2 2 h and the ine¢ cient agent expects a zero payo¤. These payo¤s are independent of the …rst period contract DP 1 . The principal's optimal …rst period pooling contract DP 1 , therefore, maximizes DP 1 q 1 T 1 subject to the agent's participation constraints over both periods. The ine¢ cient agent receives a rent in t = 2 only for . In this case, his participation constraint is T 1 (1 l )q 1 + 0 so that the optimal …rst period contract is q 1 = 1 and
. It yields the principal the payo¤ l + in t = 1. For > , the ine¢ cient agent does not expect a rent from the sequentially rational contract so that his participation constraint is T 1 (1 l )q 1 0. Hence, the optimal …rst period contract is q 1 = 1 and T 1 = 1 l . It yields the principal the payo¤ l in t = 1.
Adding the payo¤s over both period yields the principal's maximum payo¤ from a pooling contract under delegation as
if 2 ( ; ], and DP = l + 2 2 h otherwise.
Next, we show that
. In order to compute P , note that <^ ( l ), which follows from:
which is positive because the fraction is smaller than 1. Moreover, >^ ( h ), which follows from:
Using Proposition 1, we can subsequently derive P as:
These terms are all non-negative, because
Proof of Lemma 5 Given the report on L in t = 1, the principal's problem is equivalent to a static contracting problem where there is private information about K 2 f h ; l g. As in Lemma 1, the participation of the agent when K = l and the incentive compatibility constraint when K = h are binding. This yields transfers:
Substituting these variables in the principal's objective function yields:
Maximizing this expression for q 
Likewise, it follows from Lemmas 5 and 6 that, regardless of his report in t = 1, the agent with the low labor e¢ ciency l receives no rent in t = 2. Thus,
is incentive compatible to the agent with labor e¢ ciency l if:
Combining the two conditions above shows that
is incentive compatible when:
Implementability requires 1 h + < 1 l + which holds when < 1=(1 ):
From Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 it follows that the agent with labor e¢ ciency h receives in t = 2 an expected information rent of irrespective of his report in t = 1. Thus,
is incentive compatible to the agent with labor e¢ ciency h if
Likewise, it follows from Lemma 5 that the agent with low labor e¢ ciency l receives an expected rent in t = 2 from reporting l . If he reports h instead then, by Lemma 6, he receives no rent in t = 2. Thus,
Combining the previous two conditions shows that
is incentive compatible exactly when:
Hence, implementability requires 1 h < 1 l + which is always the case.
Case iii) >^ ( h ): From Lemma 5 it follows that the agent with labor e¢ ciency h receives no rent in t = 2 if he truthfully reports is incentive compatible to the agent with labor e¢ ciency h if
Likewise, it follows from Lemma 5 that, irrespective of his report in t = 2, the agent with labor e¢ ciency l receives no rent in t = 2. Thus,
is incentive compatible to the agent with labor e¢ ciency l if
Combining the previous two conditions shows that DS 1 is incentive compatible exactly when:
Implementability requires 1 h + < 1 l which holds when < 1= .
Proof of Proposition 2 A …rst period contract with early information revelation 
and we are left to determine T 
0:
At the optimum the participation constraint of type l and h are binding. This yields
For >^ ( h ) we minimize ET 1 under the incentive constraints (A5) and the participation constraints,
At the optimum the participation constraint of type l and the incentive constraint of type h are binding. This yields
Proof of Proposition 3 By Lemma 4, centralization is optimal whenever …rst period separation under delegation is not implementable. We therefore only need to compare centralization is optimal irrespective of . Instead, for^ (0) < ^ ( l ), delegation is optimal whenever it is implementable which is the case for e 1= (1 ) .
< 0, where the …rst inequality follows because ^ ( l ) >^ (0). Hence, delegation is optimal whenever implementable and implementability is always ensured. For >^ ( h ) and < 1= we have
. This is negative exactly when < b (
Proof of Proposition 4 From the expressions in (6), the agent's second period rent is zero in any case. Thus,
is incentive compatible if:
Combining the previous two conditions shows that CS 1 is incentive compatible exactly when:
implying that implementability requires 1 h < 1 l which is always the case.
In t = 1; the principal minimizes the expected transfer:
subject to the e¢ cient agent's truth-telling incentive and the ine¢ cient agent's participation:
and T l 1
Again, these constraints are binding in the optimal contract, and
Proof of Lemma 8 With separating in the …rst period, the principal learns the agent type after the …rst period so that any renegotiation-proof contract is "…rst-best e¢ cient" in the second period and exhibits: q In order to induce …rst period separation, the principal has to respect the following incentive compatibility conditions:
for the agent whose labor e¢ ciency is h ; and
for the agent whose labor e¢ ciency is 
that it follows
Bester and Strausz (2001) show that, despite imperfect commitment by the principal, direct mechanisms can implement any Pareto optimal outcome between the principal and the agent. These direct mechanisms induce the agent to report his type truthfully with a strictly positive probability, but may also require the agent to misreport with a strictly positive probability. In order to represent such mechanisms in our context, let
where L 2 fh; lg; denote the probability that the agent of type L reports his type truthfully. A combination ( h ; l ) represents the agent's reporting strategy when facing a direct mechanism. Because we can always relabel messages, we may also restrict attention to reporting strategies with h 1 l . Pooling contracts then coincide with the reporting strategy h = l = 1=2 and (full) separation contracts coincide with the reporting strategy h = l = 1. Because we focus in this appendix on reporting strategies that imply neither full pooling or full separation, we consider only reporting strategies from the set:
Moreover, denote by L 2 the principal's posterior belief that the agent is e¢ cient after he reports about L in t = 1: For a given reporting strategy h and l , the principal's beliefs h 2 and l 2 , in equilibrium, must satisfy Bayes'rule:
For any reporting strategy
In an equilibrium, the principal's o¤er in t = 2 is sequentially rational given the agent's reporting behavior. We can, therefore, view it as contingent on the agent's report on L and also on the principal's observation of K . The crucial question is whether the sequentially rational contract itself is a pooling or a separating one. Thus, let LK denote the probability that the principal o¤ers a pooling contract in t = 2 given the agent's report on L and her observation of K . By Lemma 1, the principal's sequentially rational behavior implies: On the equilibrium path, any sequentially rational contract in t = 2, leaves a rent to the agent only if the contract is a pooling one and, in this case, the rent is . The agent of type h therefore expects to receive the rent with probability Lh + (1 ) Ll when he reports L . Because, in equilibrium, the agent's reporting strategy ( h ; l ) must be optimal, the reporting probability h satis…es:
Similarly, because the agent of type l will not receive a rent in t = 2, the reporting strategy l , in equilibrium, satis…es:
With the help of h ; l and LK ; the principal's expected payo¤ in the beginning of t = 1 can be written as:
Therefore, if semi-separation under centralization is optimal, then there exists a combination ( h ; l ) 2 A that maximizes C semi subject to (B1), (B2), (B3), and (B4). In order to solve this problem, we …rst show that, with semi-separation, optimal reporting strategies are necessarily such that they induce a belief of the principal that makes her exactly indi¤erent about o¤ering a pooling or separating contract in t = 2: The intuition behind this result is that these beliefs bring the principal's myopic second period behavior in line with the principal's ex ante perspective of t = 1. Because, in equilibrium, the principal's beliefs depend on the agent's reporting strategy, his reporting behavior is a key instrument for controlling the principal's myopic behavior in t = 2. 
and is to maximize under the incentive constraints,
which is smaller than DS for the entire implementable range 2 (^ ( l );^ ( h )):
For 2 (^ (0);^ ( h )); delegation is optimal even when considering semi-separating strategies. For >^ ( h ); the region of delegation in Figure 1 survives unless is very high. With the semi-separating strategy, the probability of no production in both periods is strictly positive. However, there is a chance that separation takes places in t = 1 with no rent provision in t = 2: Thus, if it is highly likely that the agent is e¢ cient, the principal prefers to take a risk in t = 1 by inducing the agent's randomization. By doing so, the principal's cost to separate the agent's types in t = 1 becomes lower. If, however, the agent is not highly likely to be e¢ cient, the principal is better o¤ by avoiding the semi-separating strategy. 
